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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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)
)
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)
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)
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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
I.

Introduction.
Phyllis E. Lorenzen, individually and as the trustee of two trusts, filed the instant action

in October, 2016, seeking, among other relief, a determination that she and the trusts she
represented owned an express easement , and to the extent there was no express easement , an
implied over prope1iy owned by the defendants, David and Cynthia Pearson. At that time, the
residence on the Lorenzen property was not occupied by Ms. Lorenzen but rather was occupied
by tenants of Ms. Lorenzen. The issue that instigated the lawsuit was use of the driveway
easement by the tenants of Ms. Lorenzen . When Ms. Lorenzen died in December, 2016, the
primary issue in the case becan1e a determination of whether the easement rights held by Ms.
Lorenzen to use the driveway on Pearsons' property expired at her death or continued to her
heirs, successors and assigns. Based upon the following express words in Trial Exhibit 2
Pearsons contended that the easement expired at Ms. Lorenzen 's death:
RESERV ING unto Grantors, their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to use the oval
roadway as the same now exists on the above-described property, and
Also granting unto Grantees the right to use for ingress and egress the existing roadway
running from the South-westerly corner of the above described property southerly to the
existing highway.
II.

Argument.
The decision of the trial court and the appellate briefing of the parties to date reflect

agreement as to the Idaho case law that established relevant precedent and articulated the proper

principles to analyze Trial Exhibit 2 to determine whether it is ambiguous. The trial court found
Trial Exhibit 2 to be ambiguous in three p01iions:
First, the court finds the grant is ambiguous as a matter of law in that it runs to the
Grantees Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen and is silent as to their invitees, their family,
repairmen, and delivery people. It can be read to apply only to the Lorenzens, personally,
or to other persons necessary to the Lorenzens' enjoyment of TN10420 ..... On the face
of the deed, Exhibit 2, it is reasonable interpretation of the Plaintiffs easement grant to
Plaintiff to use the Defendants' driveway was intended to allow people other than Lewey
and Phyllis Lorenzen to use the roadway to access the Plaintiff's property in the ordinary
course of accessing and using their property.
Second, the court finds this grant to be ambiguous as a matter of law because it describes
the use as only reaching from the southwest corner of TN 10420. That interpretation,
taken literally as Mr. Pearson would have the court do, would allow Defendants to use all
of the oval driveway on Plaintiff's property but would deprive the Plaintiff of the right to
go around the no1ihern arc of its oval driveway, which would render the driveway
substantially useless to Plaintiff under the circumstances.
Third, the corni finds the grant to be ambiguous as a matter of law because the language
of the deed as it relates to the Grantors reservation of the right to use the oval driveway
and the grant to the grantees of the right to use Defendants' driveway can be read to have
two inconsistent meanings. First, it can be read as two completely, separate rights, one
interpretation being that the reservation to grantors is expressly appurtenant as this court
found above, but the grant to the grantees is not appurtenant language and is merely a
right of use personal to the grantees. However, if one looks carefully at the language and
reads the language as one sentence, as it is written, and despite the fact that there are
separate paragraphs, a different reasonable interpretation becomes obvious. In other
words, if the sentence is read as one sentence it looks like this:
Subject to: Reserving unto Grantors, their heirs, successors and assigns,
the right to use the oval roadway as the same now exists on the above
described property, and Also granting to Grantees the right to use for
ingress and egress the existing roadway ru1ming from the Southwesterly
corner of the above described property Southerly to the existing highway.
This change only involves the deletion of the paragraph between the word "and" and the
word "Also". Read together like this as all pmi of a single sentence it becomes unclear
whether the heirs and assigns language is meant to apply to the grant to the grantees and
the reservation to the grantors, or not. If one looks closely at Exhibits 2, 3, 4 m1d 10 it
becomes clear that there was a common drafter's preference or practice of separating
parcels rights, and rights meets and bounds descriptions in the legal descriptions by
paragraphs. This may have more to do with the formality of drafting conventions for
purposes of tracking title and plats than it does to the intent of the drafters. R. pp. I 04106.

It is the third finding of ambiguity that is the threshold for this case. If the deed is not
ambiguous in this regard, the plain and only meaning of the relevant words is that the right to use
Pearsons ' driveway did not extend beyond the death of the last surviving of the grantees, Phyllis
Lorenzen. Hence, the easement would no longer exist. The holdings of the trial court as to what
persons could use the easement or what paiis of Pearsons' property would be burdened become
moot. It is notable that Lorenzen makes no argument in their appellate brief that there are
multiple inconsistent meanings generated by the presence and absence of "heirs, successors and
assigns" language or that the trial court's modification of the phrases is not a contortion. Rather,
Lorenzen conflates the issue of "persons necessary to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen's enjoyment
of the Lorenzen Prope1iy" with the "heirs, successors and assigns" issue. Respondent's Brief p.
14. Put another way, whether Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen as used in the deed is an ambiguous
plu·ase that encompasses guests, tradesmen, delivery people is different issue from the question
whether the easement was extended to the Lorenzens' "heirs, successors and assigns". In their
appellate brief, Lorenzen bootstraps the claimed ambiguity of Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen to the
"heirs, successors and assigns" issue rather than arguing for the trial court's contortion of the
"heirs, successors and assigns" phrase. Pearsons urge the Court to recognize that the ambiguity
on which a comi relies to justify taking extrinsic evidence to determine intent and then alter the
plain meaning of the words in the instrument must be germane or relevant to the issue. For
example, the first finding of ambiguity as noted above by the trial court is not a sufficient basis
to suppmi a revision of the plain meaning of the instrument so that the easement is extended to
the "heirs, successors and assigns" of Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen or to expand the property
burdened by the easement, as argued by Lorenzen in their appellate brief. Though the trial
court's conclusions were erroneous, it correctly acknowledged that an ambiguity must be

germane to the issue by holding that there are three ambiguities. It was analytically necessary
that the trial court identify its second ambiguity to support its expansion of the area burdened by
the easement. It was also analytically necessary that it hold the phrasing of "heirs, successors
and assigns" ambiguous to supp01i its extension of the easement to the heirs, successors and
assigns of Lorenzen. Lorenzen's argument that the first finding of ambiguity by the trial court is
sufficient to supp01i its modifications of the grant to extend the area burdened by the easement
and to extend the easement to the heirs, successors and assigns should fail.
The trial court and Lorenzen rely upon the presumption that "in cases of doubt, the
weight of authority holds that the easement should be presumed appurtenant." Nelson v. Johnson,
106 Idaho 385 , 388, 679 P.2d 662 (1984). R. p. 111. In Nelson there was no evidence in the
record of a document similar to Trial Exhibit 2 wherein one easement contains the phrase "heirs,
successors and assigns" and an immediately following easement does not contain that same
language plainly making a distinction between the two on the issue of duration of the easement.
This is a significant distinction that was minimized by the trial court in its determination that
Pearsons failed to rebut the presumption that the easement was appurtenant. Another significant
distinction from Nelson is the fact that the Lorenzen prope1ty has not been sold to a series of
successors. In Nelson each of the several successors to Wakes' used the Butler Springs water
rights without objection until Jolmson objected in 1978. There is no history in the case now
before this court of successors to Lorenzen using the Pearson driveway easement. The plain
meaning of the language of the grant to Lorenzen gave Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen the right to
use the driveway. For these reasons, the presumption cited in Nelson should not be held to
govern the decision in this case.

The trial court cites evidence of the use of the roadway by Lorenzens before and after the
execution of Trial Exhibit 2 as evidence of the intent of Williams that the easement extend to the
heirs, successors and assigns of Lorenzen. R. pp. 107-109. However, all of that same evidence
can be viewed as consistent with a grant to Lorenzen that would expire of the death of the last of
Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen. Only upon their deaths does the absence of "heirs, successors and
assigns" in the grant to Lorenzen become an issue. Significant undisputed evidence in the record
strongly supports a determination that Lorenzens knew that their easement rights to the Pearsons'
driveway would not extend to their heirs, successors and assigns. This evidence consists of tlu·ee
elements. First, is Trial Exhibit 4 by which Williams conveyed to Lorenzen a parcel that became
TN 11365 in October, 1978. An examination of Trial Exhibit 29 will reveal that if the easement
granted to Lorenzen in Trial Exhibit 2 was intended to be appurtenant, then ownership of TN
11365 was not necessary to Lorenzens or their successors' access to the highway from TN 10420
since they would have a permanent and transferable right to use the Pearsons' driveway.
However, if the easement to Lorenzen in Trial Exhibit 2 was only personal to Lorenzens, then it
would be important that Lorenzens own TN 11365 in order to provide a continuous ownership
route from the Lorenzen residence to the highway . Second, Lorenzen acquired ownership of TN
3178 and TN 11366 which as shown on Trial Exhibit 29 then provide a continuous route to the
highway from TN 10420 and the Lorenzen residence . Third, when Lorenzen sold TN 3178 to
his daughter Shelley, he retained TN 11366 for himself, thereby preserving his continuous route
to the highway by a route other than the Pearsons' driveway. Tr. pp. 56-61. Lorenzens would
not have been compelled to develop their separate access route as long as one of them was alive,
but by arranging Lorenzens' ownership as reflected by the undisputed evidence, Lorenzens
provided an access route after their deaths for their heirs, successors and assigns. This evidence

is entirely consistent with the plain meaning of the language of Trial Exhibit 2 to the effect that
the easement granted to Lorenzen did not extend to his heirs, successors and assigns.
Lorenzen makes no argument in their appellate brief that the trial comi's second, as
identified above, finding of ambiguity satisfies the tests, multiple inconsistent meanings and
plain meaning, for ambiguity established by the cited precedents, especially Camp Easton

Forever. Camp Easton Forever, Inc. v. Inland Northwest Council Boy Scouts of America, 156
Idaho 893, 332 P.3d 805 (2014) . Pearson relies on its briefing on this issue in its Appellants'
Brief, page 15 .
The trial comt erred in admitting and relying upon Trial Exhibit 3, also identified as
Kootenai County Recorders Office Instrument Number 1444492. R. pp. 110-111. This deed
conveyed the Williams/Pearson property to Vaughan more than five months after Trial Exhibit 2
was given.

Lorenzen argues and the trial court found that Trial Exhibit 3 was " substantial and

competent evidence of Williams' intent that the earlier easement be appurtenant to the Lorenzen
Property and benefitting the heirs, successors and assigns of Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen". The
language that was relied upon by the trial comt and cited in its decision is as follows:
Subject to right granted to Lewey H . Lorenzen and Phyllis L. Lorenzen, their heirs,
successors and assigns the right to use for ingress and egress roadway existing as of October
1976 running from the South-westerly corner of the Lorenzen property above described
Southerly to the existing highway.
The Court has previously held as follows:
While the deed does state that the conveyance is "subject to" and easement we have held that
this kind of language is "not evidence of a grantor's intent to reserve or except and
easement," but merely "an attempt to create an exception to the grantor's warranties of title
and quiet enjoyment and thereby limit the grantor's potential liability,". Machado v. Ryan,
280 P.3d 715, 722 (2012).
With respect to Trial Exhibit 3, the trial court stated, "As such, without granting any rights in
Plaintiff, it can be used to show the intent of the Williams five months earlier.

The court

considers this language to create further doubt as to the intent of Williams in creating the
easement in Exhibit 2. This is further evidence of the ambiguity of Exhibit 2." The explicit
reliance by the trial court on Trial Exhibit 3 over the objection of Pearson was substantial and
prejudicial error.
Lorenzen carelessly and inaccurately claims on page 16 of Respondent's Brief that
"Pearsons' Opening Brief flatly misrepresents the district court's record stating that 'no
contemporaneous person was brought forward as a witness .... "'. The actual words in Pearsons'
brief on page 18 thereof are, "No other contemporaneous person was brought forward as a
witness". The statement follows a description of testimony by Shelley Lorenzen pertaining to
the transaction evidence by Trial Exhibit 2.
III.

Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Lorenzen has claimed attorney fees on appeal. Pearson urges the Court to deny this

claim. The case presents substantial questions of law regarding the alleged ambiguity of a deed,
Trial Exhibit 2, over which the Court exercises free review. Fwther, the trial court did not apply
the law properly in analyzing Trial Exhibit 2, particularly with regards to the location of the
easement and access to TN 11366 from the easement. Attorney fees should not be awarded on
this appeal.
IV.

Conclusion.
This case presents an example of the hazards involved in permitting parole evidence to

alter or vary the terms of a conveyance of real property made by a straightforward and
unambiguous deed. Over the objections of counsel and contrary to established precedent the trial
comt chose to rely heavily upon Trial Exhibit 3 to show the intent of the grantor in Trial Exhibit
2. The trial court then held as ambiguous an unambiguous phrase in Trial Exhibit 2 by trying to

contort the phrase to give the phrase and alternate inconsistent meaning. The trial couti went
further astray in holding that an unambiguous description of the location of the easement,
"running from the South-westerly corner of the above described property Southerly to the
existing highway" was ambiguous because it "would render the oval driveway substantially
useless to Plaintiff under the circumstances". Trial Exhibit 13 demonstrates plainly that the
"useless" conclusion is unwarranted and illustrates the weakness of the logic of the trial comt on
this issue. Finally the trial court decreed that Lorenzen have an appmtenant easement to access
TN 11366 from the driveway for parking when Trial Exhibit 2 made absolutely no provision for
such use, ambiguous or otherwise.

One can reasonably infer that Lorenzens accepted Trial

Exhibit 2 when given by Williams as satisfactory evidence of their agreement. On its face the
deed plainly stated that the easement reserved to Williams extended to their heirs, successors and
assigns while in the following phrase the easement given to the Grantees, Lorenzen, did not
contain any words that would extend their easement to their heirs, successors and assigns.
Further, Lorenzen ensured and retained for himself and his heirs, successors and assigns access
to the highway by acquiring and retaining TN 11366 and TN 11365 to this date.
Pearsons ask that the Court hold that Trial Exhibit 2 is not ambiguous and that the
easement therein granted to Lorenzen expired upon the death of Phyllis Lorenzen.
st
Dated this 1 day of September, 2019.
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)

· Robert Covington, Attorney for Pearson

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in
compliance with all of the requirements of IAR 34 and that and electronic copy was served
on:
Idaho Supreme Court

scbriefs(a)icourts.net

Doug Marfice
Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy and Harris

dmarfice(a)rmehlaw .com.

Dated this 1st day of September, 2019.

Robert Covington

